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“Signs of the Times”:
Medicine and Nationhood in British India
By Pratik Chakrabarti*
ABSTRACT
Medical practice and research in colonial India historically had been an imperial 
preserve, dominated by the elite members of the Indian Medical Service. This was 
contested from the 1900s on by the emerging Indian nationalism. This essay stud-
ies debates about the establishment of a medical research institution and how ac-
tors imposed the political identities of nationalism on British colonial practices of 
medical science. At the same time, Indian nationalism was also drawing from other 
emerging ideas around health and social welfare. The Indian nationalists and doc-
tors sought to build the identities of the new nation and its medicine around their 
own ideas of its geography, people, and welfare.
INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 1923, Lt. Col. S. H. Burnett, an offi cer of the Indian Medical Service 
(IMS), traveled from 29 Pembridge Square, London, along Hyde Park to the India 
House, Whitehall, to meet Edward J. Turner, undersecretary of state for India, to ex-
plain his reasons for premature retirement from his post of surgeon superintendent 
of St. George’s Hospital in Bombay.1 Burnett had two main grievances against the 
medical service in India. The fi rst concerned the fi nancial disincentives: lack of de-
cent salary and the loss of private practice. The second grievance was an immediate 
one: “I fi nd myself now confronted with a totally new and unexpected position in that 
a committee of three Indians appointed by the Bombay University are to visit and, 
virtually, inspect the European General Hospital reporting on it with a view to its af-
fi liation as a fi eld for clinical study and instruction of postgraduates among whom 
will, doubtless, be Indians.”2
In December 1921, Fardunji M. Dastur (registrar, University of Bombay) had writ-
ten to the government of Bombay’s surgeon general that a university committee had 
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1 “Lt Col SH Burnett, I.M.S., Reasons for taking leave preparatory to Retirement including Question 
of Examination of European Patients by Indian Medical Students,” C&R 1784, 1923, L / E / 7 / 1156, 
Asia, Pacifi c and Africa Collections, British Library, London (hereafter cited as APAC).
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been appointed to inspect St. George’s Hospital.3 Burnett, in charge of the hospi-
tal, saw a more sinister plan behind this inspection: the university was encroaching 
upon a British medical institution; the proposed recognition of this European General 
Hospital as a study fi eld for certain postgraduates was likely to be followed by the 
inclusion of Indian postgraduates also.4 The proposal of inspection by Indians, he 
suspected, was designed to convert the hospital into a site of regular study for Indian 
medical students. This was unacceptable to Burnett, as the hospital would then not 
remain an exclusively European institution. He concluded, “[T]he visit of the Com-
mittee I regard as signs of the times which, in conjunction with the drawbacks I have 
already represented, prompt me to ask for leave pending retirement.”5
In London, Burnett urged Turner to ensure that the European hospital in Bombay 
should not be turned into a training ground for Indian students. Turner forwarded 
Burnett’s letters to the government of India (GOI) and the registrar of Bombay Uni-
versity and urged that the case be taken up by the director general of Indian Medical 
Service (DGIMS) as well.6 But he was informed that there was little the imperial gov-
ernment could do in this matter, as medical administration, including hospitals and 
provisions for medical education, following the Indian reforms of 1919, was a “trans-
ferred subject” in which only the governor of Bombay and the provincial Council 
of Ministers were responsible.7 Lord William Peel, the secretary of state, wrote to 
Governor George Lloyd, who replied that he considered Burnett’s objection “a grave 
one.”8 Soon, Lloyd informed Peel that the surgeon general of Bombay had assured 
him there was no move to make the St. George’s Hospital an institution of medical 
instruction for university graduates. He had in fact withdrawn this facility from the 
university itself, and now the hospital was available only to the military assistant 
surgeons.9 Lloyd reassured Peel, “I need scarcely add that I should never dream of al-
lowing European patients in our hospitals out here to be used as clinical material for 
the study of Indian medical students.”10
Although the matter seemed resolved, this was indeed a sign of the times in India. 
With the rise of nationalism, medical research and education were becoming con-
tested territory. The contestation was occurring in three areas. One was the culture 
of medical instruction for Indian doctors. The second was the enrolment of more 
Indians in such institutions, and the third was the more general arena of the state and 
welfare. 
There was growing professional pressure from Indian university- based medical 
faculties and students who formed the nongovernment independent medical profes-
sion (non- IMS) that had led to the antagonism and distrust of the IMS toward this 
group. Related to this was the question of facilities of clinical study and research 
for Indian doctors and students. Burnett’s case also represented the increasing dis-
contentment among the IMS offi cers about their service conditions, salaries, living 
3 Fardunji M. Dastur to the Surgeon General, Govt. of Bombay, 13 Dec. 1921, L / E / 7 / 1156, APAC.
4 Burnett to the Personal Assistant to the Surgeon General, Govt. of Bombay, 8 Jan. 1922, 1, L / E / 7 / 
1156, APAC.
5 Ibid., 2–3.
6 Turner’s note to the Government of India (GOI), 1 May 1923, L / E / 7 / 1156, APAC.
7 Note from Dawson to Turner, 8 Aug. 1923, L / E / 7 / 1156, APAC.
8 Draft paragraph of the private letter from Lord Peel to Sir George Lloyd, 14 May 1923, 1, L / E /
 7 / 1156, APAC.
9 Lloyd to Peel, Turner, and Hirtzel, 8 June 1923, L / E / 7 / 1156, APAC.
10 Ibid.
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standards, and loss of private practice. There was also a rising anxiety among the IMS 
about losing control in the country’s medical matters, as after 1919, public health, 
hospitals, and medical administration had passed to provincial legislative control. 
Burnett’s objection to the Indian inspection of a British institution refl ected a gen-
eral British fear and anxiety about Indian encroachment. What was that encroach-
ment? Nationalism in its attempts to create its own identities and spaces had chal-
lenged some of the established norms of medical tradition that the British had so 
carefully established in India, a process that engendered political, physical, moral, 
and institutional encroachment. This had also created a disjuncture in the established 
ideas of medicine and the state. British ideas of public health, from the mid- nineteenth 
century on, were based on the Chadwickian notion that people’s health was a matter 
of public and state concern.11 The British had sought to introduce this notion in India 
as well, albeit on a limited scale. But it was precisely this convergence of the “public” 
and the “state” that was now being contested in India. The nationalist movement, 
which was growing in popularity, was challenging the authority of the colonial state 
to represent public concern and welfare as part of its struggle for state power. Thus in 
India, the question of science and national identity had become a political one. David 
Potter has suggested that one of the main reasons for decolonization in the postwar 
period was the shortage of manpower in the British Empire.12 This crisis, he argues, 
developed independent of the nationalist movement. I would like to suggest that this 
crisis of manpower was indeed a political issue, sparked by nationalist politics.
The essay will also demonstrate that in this period, despite the obvious differences, 
there was also a convergence in the practices of science and medicine in the develop-
mental frameworks of emerging nation- states. This was within a broader concomi-
tance of industrialism and development, the Soviet model of planned economy, and 
the political ideology of socialism. The health planning of India in the 1930s and 
the 1940s, as pursued by the nationalists, was driven by the same faith and ideal-
ism that had shaped science- based development of the emerging nations, particularly 
following developmental plans of the Soviet Union and the intellectual realignment 
between science and society following the Second International Congress of the His-
tory of Science in London in 1931. This was an important alliance of science and 
medicine in planning national development, a plan which shared a problematic rela-
tionship with Gandhi. 
RESEARCH AND MEDICINE IN COLONIAL INDIA
The university- government divide in medical research that Burnett’s episode alludes 
to holds a key to the history of medicine in India, as well as to the history of Indian 
nationalism. University education and teaching had been the mainstays for the emer-
gent Indian middle class, and universities had historically been an important site for 
Indian intellectuals, for their political struggles. The fi rst generation of Indian scien-
tists who became prominent at the turn of the twentieth century were all products of 
the Indian universities.
There are some notable features in this enmeshed history of science and medi-
11 Christopher Hamlin, “State Medicine in Great Britain,” in The History of Public Health and the 
Modern State, ed. Dorothy Porter (Amsterdam, 1994), 134–44. 
12 David C. Potter, “Manpower Shortage and the End of Colonialism: The Case of the Indian Civil 
Service,” Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973): 47–73.
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cine. David Arnold has pointed out that although there were several Indian scientists 
working in physics and chemistry, there were very few working in medicine.13 A 
related phenomenon was that even the engagement in physics and chemistry tended 
to be more in fundamental science than in applied science. As noted by Y. Guay, be-
tween 1907 and 1926, while British chemists in India devoted their time exclusively 
to applied research, Indian scientists were more interested in pure and theoretical 
research.14
Part of the explanation for this, as argued elsewhere, was that for many Indian sci-
entists, research was a moral and fundamental quest, part of their search for nation-
hood and identity in the modern world.15 Besides, university education in India, as 
initiated by the British, was based on the principles of the Victorian educator Thomas 
Arnold, which stressed “character building.” The British saw these principles as par-
ticularly relevant for Indians, whom they perceived to be in need of the virtues of 
science and rationality.16 The Indian university- based science curriculum tended to 
focus on fundamental sciences, physics and chemistry, and mathematics. 
The other reason was the British monopoly in medical sciences in India begin-
ning in the mid- eighteenth century. This dominance was institutionalized through the 
formation of the IMS, a body of medical men emerging from the eighteenth- century 
military traditions of the English East India Company.17 As the company’s territo-
rial control over the Indian subcontinent expanded by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, British doctors of the essentially military establishment had larger civilian 
practices as well, in the hospitals, dispensaries, and research institutions springing up 
in the various parts of the country. This dual role of the IMS, in military and civilian 
health care, was unique and crucial to its survival and infl uence. With the assump-
tion in India of crown rule in 1858, public health became an important concern of the 
government, thereby further increasing the sphere of activity of the British medical 
offi cers. The other important characteristic of the IMS was its strong metropolitan 
links. The entrance exams for recruitment were held only in England, and candi-
dates received their training almost entirely in British universities. By contrast, in 
the Indian university curriculum, courses in medical science and research remained 
rudimentary, and very few Indians joined the profession until the turn of the twentieth 
century. 
The history of the British initiative in medical research has also to be seen against 
the backdrop of the lack of government investment in either science laboratories or 
technical education. The only investment in research by the state was in medical sci-
ence, in the bacteriological laboratories, pioneered by the IMS cadres in the 1890s. 
13 David Arnold, “Colonial Medicine in Transition: Medical Research in India, 1910–47,” South 
Asia Research 14 (1994): 10–35, 27.
14 Y. Guay, “Emergence of Basic Research on the Periphery: Organic Chemistry in India, 1907–
1926,” Scientometrics 10 (1986): 77–94, 87–88. On the other side of the spectrum was the nationalist 
movement for technical education and institutions: Aparna Basu, “The Indian Response to Scientifi c 
and Technical Education in the Colonial Era, 1820–1920,” in Science and Empire: Essays in Indian 
Context, 1700–1947, ed. Deepak Kumar (Delhi, 1991); and Basu, “Technical Education in India, 
1900–1920,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 4 (1967): 361–74.
15 Pratik Chakrabarti, Western Science in Modern India: Metropolitan Methods, Colonial Practices 
(New Delhi, 2004), 146–214.
16 Ellen E. McDonald, “English Education and Social Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Bombay: 
A Case Study in the Transmission of a Cultural Ideal,” Journal of Asian Studies 25 (1966): 455–60.
17 For a study of the emergence of the IMS, see Mark Harrison, Public Health in British India, 
Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine, 1859–1914 (Cambridge, UK, 1994), 6–35. 
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Throughout the colonial period, hardly any facilities for research in physics or chem-
istry existed outside the small university laboratories. Appeals for research facilities 
by nationalists and scientists remained unheeded. In 1890, following the visit by the 
prominent physicist J. C. Bose, some distinguished scientists in the United Kingdom 
wrote to the secretary of State for the establishment of a central laboratory in Cal-
cutta.18 The GOI, however, refused to consent, citing “the present state of fi nances.”19 
This was indeed part of a long tradition of refusing such requests.20
Apprehension about the uncertain consequences of the practice of science by the 
natives, particularly in the context of increasing nationalism, perhaps motivated this 
reluctance as well. In 1890, an editorial in the Anglo- Indian newspaper Civil and 
Military Gazette, while commenting on the introduction of modern science in India, 
mentioned that “one has to be careful because the crooked native mind could transfer 
any knowledge, as it had done with modern education, rather than accepting as an 
idea of reason, into an ideology of dissent.”21 Medical research, by contrast, was con-
sidered to be the stronghold of the imperial regime and thus a safer investment. The 
British Medical Journal supported the suggestion put forward in the Indian Medical 
Congress of 1894 that some of the government funds for education be used for build-
ing medical research institutes, adding that the “educated Bengali babus” were only 
interested in becoming “disloyal and seditious agitators.”22
This had created a two- tiered medical profession in India. Prior to the First World 
War, IMS offi cers had manned most of the medical research institutes and university 
professorships, apart from the military posts, while the Indian graduates occupied the 
subordinate posts. Until 1913, Indians composed only 5 percent of the IMS; by 1921 
their numbers had risen to compose 6.25 percent.23 The nonoffi cial medical workers 
had formed their own organizations, such as the Bombay Medical Union (BMU) and 
the Calcutta Medical Club. They mainly directed their activities toward “enhancing 
the status and dignity of the Indian medical profession.”24 They also formed what was 
commonly known as the “university group.” 
Such a system generated areas of confl ict. The growth of the independent medical 
profession was not totally undesired by the government as it promised more cheaply 
trained doctors at a time when doctors were increasingly in demand in the empire. 
For example, in 1899, George Hamilton, the secretary of state, had urged the GOI to 
18 “Memorial from Certain Distinguished Scientists Advocating the Establishment of a Central La-
boratory at Calcutta,” 12 May 1897, File 723, L / PJ / 6 / 445, APAC.
19 Reply from A. Godley, India Offi ce, 21 March 1898, File 460, L / PJ / 6 / 473, APAC. 
20 In 1898, a similar request was refused by the secretary of state on the ground that the required sum 
of six lakhs of rupees could not be spared as it was the time of the Afghan wars. Hitavadi, a vernacular 
newspaper, commented, “It is a wonder that a man in the position of the Secretary of State has not 
hesitated to make such a reply. A Government unable to spare six lakhs for a benefi cial object is wast-
ing crores in foreign wars!” Hitavadi, 1 April 1898, in Report on Native Papers of Bengal Presidency, 
1898, File 345, L / R / 5 / 24, APAC. Bose’s requests for assistance for his institute in 1917 were refused 
as well: see “Application of Dr. J. C. Bose, CSI, CIE, for Certain Grants of Money to Enable Him to 
Carry Out His Scheme for a Research Institution in Furtherance of the Work in Which He Is Engaged,” 
Department of Education, A, Proceedings, July 1917, Nos. 9–11, National Archives of India, New 
Delhi (hereafter cited as NAI).
21 Civil and Military Gazette, 17 April 1890, 4.
22 “A Bacteriological Department for India,” British Medical Journal (BMJ) 1 (1897): 31–32.
23 Roger Jeffery, “Recognizing India’s Doctors: The Institutionalization of Medical Dependency, 
1918–1939,” Modern Asian Studies 13 (1979): 301–26, 311.
24 As quoted in Mridula Ramanna, Western Medicine and Public Health in Colonial Bombay, 1845–
1895 (New Delhi, 2002), 3.
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sponsor the independent medical profession in India for provincial civilian services. 
But the plans were dropped as British residents opposed any reduction of European 
medical assistance for their well- being.25 However, by the turn of the century, two de-
velopments had become apparent: the government had realized that the growth of the 
IMS needed to be reduced for reasons of cost, and members of the IMS were growing 
anxious about the loss of their lucrative civilian practice.
These developments had followed several decades of protests by the independent 
medical professionals. Since the late nineteenth century, the BMU, in partnership 
with the Indian National Congress (INC), had been demanding an end to the monop-
oly of the IMS.26 In 1913, BMU had sent its representations to the Royal Commission 
on the Public Services in India demanding equal status, privileges, and emoluments 
for the independent medical men, especially those in higher grades.27 
The same year, the Indian Medical Gazette, a publication by the IMS offi cers, 
complained about the political interventions and subsequent decline in IMS recruit-
ment in Britain: “The unrest in India, the treatment of that unrest by the authori-
ties and the political developments of the present day, have made men hesitate be-
fore embarking on an Indian career.” Thus, “civil practice is not what it was, little 
money can be made in many stations; moffussil life is less attractive than it used to 
be.”28 The British Medical Association (BMA), representing the IMS in England, 
also sent a memorandum deploring the present conditions of the service. According 
to them, the decreasing number of British men in the IMS posed a structural as well 
as a “grave moral” question for the future welfare of India. They stressed that India 
still needed the healing hands of imperial medicine: “Those who know the Indian 
most intimately, and who admire most intelligently his many excellent qualities as 
a profession man, cannot blind themselves to the fact that his standards are still far 
from being those of his British brother.”29 The reference here was to the unprec-
edented legislative control over British medical practices in India that was being 
imposed following the agitation by Indians, which had brought the elite service 
within the contemporary political spectrum. According to the BMA, the government 
was responsible for restricting private practice, but the opposite had occurred due 
to a movement that emanated “from the educated Indians who have been trained 
in our colleges.”30 The situation also led the British medical personnel to demand 
centralization and a reapportioning of responsibilities. The memorandum suggested 
the creation of a provincial medical service, which through its own (mostly Indian) 
medical offi cers could carry the “blessings” of Western medicine to the remote parts 
of India, leaving the IMS offi cers to concentrate on more central questions of re-
search and public health policy.31 
The contemporary political context was indeed becoming important. The early 
decades of the twentieth century in India had seen the struggle for political power. 
These had led to several constitutional and legislative concessions. The post–World 
25 Jeffery, “Recognizing India’s Doctors” (cit. n. 23), 310.
26 Ramanna, Western Medicine and Public Health (cit. n. 24), 217–21.
27 Representation of the Bombay Medical Union to the Royal Commission on the Public Services in 
India (Bombay, 1913), 1–4.
28 Indian Medical Gazette (IMG), Oct. 1913, 396–99.
29 “Memorandum on the Present Position and Future Prospects of the Indian Medical Service,” 




War I period provided the great push for the Indianization of medical services and 
further accentuated political tension. In 1919, the British introduced the Montague-
 Chelmsford Reforms, which prompted provincialization. The reforms introduced 
the concept of “dyarchy,” transferring functions such as education, health, and agri-
culture (referred to as “transferred” subjects) to provincial legislative bodies, while 
retaining others, such as fi nance, revenue, and home affairs, as “reserved” or “im-
perial.” This indirectly increased the number of elected Indian members in district 
boards and municipal corporations, since the authority to regulate local government 
bodies was placed in the hands of the popularly elected ministers, whose constituents 
naturally wanted more devolution of power.32 The reforms also provided a further 
incentive for centralization of British medical involvement in India, as the IMS and 
medical research remained largely under central governmental control.33 
RESEARCH AND PRIVILEGE
These changes had highlighted for the IMS offi cers that for them the future site of in-
volvement in India could be, not in provincialized public health institutions, but in the 
centralized research institutes. This realization came with a certain sense of regret, as 
the British considered the introduction of modern public health and hygiene to India 
as one of their greatest contributions. In 1927, GOI public health commissioner J. D. 
Graham, in his lecture on the “Medical and Sanitary Problems of India,” elaborated 
that these political reforms interfered with the essential and necessary “evolution-
ary” process of India’s public health policy.34 Graham now wanted more control to 
be vested in the hands of the central government, as in the old days, and defended the 
need for European medical men, particularly in research.35 In another lecture Graham 
stressed the need for British control over medical research, especially following the 
creation of the Bacteriological Department within the Indian government in 1906 to 
staff the medical research organizations.36 The 1919 devolution of power had made 
such a choice more obvious, fi nancially and institutionally. The department was re-
organized in 1922, to “make it more attractive.”37 When the Retrenchment Commit-
tee38 proposed the reduction of expenses in research and in recruitment for the depart-
ment, J. B. Smith (IMS, retired), medical advisor to the secretary of state, opposed 
the reduction, arguing that research opportunities became a new rationale for recruit-
ing IMS cadres in the UK: “appointments in the Bacteriological Department are held 
out as an inducement to men entering the Indian Medical Service, and it is a breach of 
the promise made if the majority of these appointments are withdrawn.”39
This had been the new journey of the IMS, from public health and hygiene, its 
proud heritage in India, to the laboratories of research. Beginning in the early de-
32 See Harrison, Public Health in British India (cit. n. 17), 60–98.
33 Arnold, “Colonial Medicine in Transition” (cit. n. 13), 24.
34 Seventh Congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, Souvenir, the Indian Em-
pire, Being a Brief Description of the Chief Features of India and Its Medical and Sanitary Problems 
(Calcutta, 1927), 55.
35 Ibid., 58.
36 “Medical Research and Organisation,” Seventh Congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropi-
cal Medicine (cit. n. 34), 102.
37 Ibid., 102–3.
38 Headed by Lord Inchcape (1922–23).
39 “Retrenchment in Expenditure on Medical Research in India,” Dept. of Education, Health, and 
Lands, A, May 1925, Nos. 17–25, 9, NAI.
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cades of the twentieth century, medical research in India became the site of privilege 
and preserve. One important aspect of that privilege was in the location of the insti-
tutes. In the British habitation of colonial India, location had been a fundamental 
imperial concern. From the middle of the nineteenth century, this had driven them to 
the salubrious hills, in an attempt to retain their racial and climatic distance from the 
dusty tropical plains. In the thickly wooded hills and swirling mists of the hill sta-
tions, the British had sought to build around themselves a replica of English life.40 
Anglo- Indian medical ethics had followed the same trend, and in seeking to avoid 
the heat and dust of tropical research it had established most of its laboratories in 
the hills, such as the Pasteur Institutes (from 1900) and a Central Research Institute 
(CRI, 1907).
The second feature of privilege in research was in funding and personnel. Pardey 
Lukis (DGIMS) wanted a group of trained men and resources that would not require 
the sanction of the secretary of state or the legislative assemblies to fund medical re-
search and so created the autonomous Indian Research Fund Association (IRFA) in 
1911.41 As pointed out by Mark Harrison, through the IRFA, which came to symbol-
ize “imperial effi ciency” and humanitarian reform, “research- oriented medical men” 
managed to create a niche for themselves in colonial medicine and administration in 
India in the interwar period.42 The IRFA also created a skewed fi nancial distribution, 
as it contributed almost exclusively to government research institutes and hardly any-
thing to the universities.
The IRFA had an imperial character, it had the Scientifi c Advisory Board to advise 
on technical matters, but the real control was vested in the Governing Body, initially 
consisting only of the DGIMS and the sanitary commissioner of India.43 The issue 
of preserving medical research for the IMS offi cers had become important by the 
1920s, and research organizations were becoming the new sites of hope for the Brit-
ish recruits. The retired IMS offi cer and an expert on Indian medical affairs, Leonard 
Rogers wrote in the BMJ, while discussing the present problems of the IMS, “There 
remains one feature of the position the importance of which for the future of India 
and the IMS can hardly be exaggerated. The development of the research department, 
so far from being checked by recent diffi culties, has received a defi nite impetus dur-
ing the past few months.”44 On another occasion, Rogers mentioned that one of the 
main attractions of the IMS was the IRFA and the research department.45
A CENTRAL MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
These pressures and the inadequacies faced during the First World War made the GOI 
look into the matter of medical research more closely. Plans were being made for a 
Central Medical Research Institute (CMRI) as the facilities of CRI in the hill station 
of Kasauli were felt to be inadequate. In 1920, the DGIMS felt it to be “a matter of 
40 Dane Kennedy, The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations and the British Raj (Berkeley, Calif., 1996).
41 Helen J. Power, “Sir Leonard Rogers FRS (1868–1962): Tropical Medicine and the Indian Medi-
cal Service” (PhD diss., Univ. of London, 1993), 148–49.
42 Harrison, Public Health in British India (cit. n. 17), 165.
43 Arnold, “Colonial Medicine in Transition” (cit. n. 13), 14.
44 BMJ 1 (1929): 1168–69. Rogers was the Indian correspondent for BMJ between 1898 and 1929.
45 “Notes on the Indian Medical Service, 1930,” ROG / C.19 / 22, Leonard Rogers Papers, Manu-
scripts, Wellcome Library, London (hereafter cited as Rogers Papers).
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urgency to establish an additional research institute in a central position.”46 The same 
year, Professor E. H. Starling of University College, London, sailed for India to ad-
vise the GOI on the location and establishment of the new institute. BMJ reported 
that the IRFA was to fund it, and Delhi was being considered as the possible site.47
Starling drew up a detailed plan and proposed the erection of an all- India medical 
research institute at Delhi, the imperial capital since 1911.48 The GOI accepted the 
scheme, and the secretary of state gave his approval.49 But following the recommen-
dations by the Retrenchment Committee, the plan was postponed indefi nitely.50 In 
1927, the issue was raised again, and this time Walter Fletcher, secretary of the Medi-
cal Research Council (MRC), was appointed the head of another committee to look 
into the matter. 
Fletcher’s arrival in India was signifi cant. One of the staunchest advocates of the 
primacy of medical research in contemporary Britain, Fletcher, as the secretary of 
the MRC from 1914 to 1933, had played a crucial role in the organization of medi-
cal sciences in Britain.51 A distinguished laboratory physiologist, Fletcher became a 
prominent statesman and administrator in the interwar period. As a strong believer in 
research, he had stressed that medical practice had to be based on research as much 
as in hospital wards.52 The interwar period in Britain saw a struggle between scien-
tists and medical practitioners about the nation’s medical policy, and Fletcher was 
engaged in ensuring the supremacy of MRC.53 Fletcher’s clash with Lord Dawson, 
president of the Royal College of Physicians, regarding the status of the MRC within 
British medical practice was an important episode in this.54 Fletcher was also a keen 
advocate of autonomy in research and was responsible for putting the MRC on the 
same footing as the Department of Scientifi c and Industrial Research (DSIR), rela-
tively free from governmental control.55
Fletcher’s agendas of prominence and autonomy of medical research, which had 
shaped contemporary British clinical medicine, corresponded perfectly with the in-
terests of the IMS offi cers in India, although the motives were very different here. 
Fletcher suggested some important modifi cations to Starling’s plans. For Fletcher, 
the question of location was fundamental for autonomy in research in India. His Re-
port of the Committee on the Organization of Medical Research, issued in 1929, sug-
gested that seclusion was paramount, however, in the colony; the agenda of seclusion 
was also linked to the efforts to escape from the heat, dust, and chaos of the tropical 
and political plains.56 The report created a new link between climate and research: “it 
46 “Proposed All India Research Institute” BMJ 1 (1920): 344.
47 Ibid.
48 Report of the Committee on the Organization of Medical Research under the Government of India 
(Calcutta, 1929), 15–16.
49 Ibid., 15.
50 “Retrenchment in Expenditure on Medical Research” (cit. n. 39), 7.
51 Joan Austoker, “Walter Morley Fletcher and the Origins of a Basic Biomedical Research Policy,” 
in Historical Perspectives on the Role of the M.R.C.: Essays in the History of the Medical Research 
Council of the United Kingdom and Its Predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, ed. Joan Aus-





56 Report of the Committee on the Organization of Medical Research (cit. n. 48), 43.
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is equally certain that basic research can best be done in a climate favourable to the 
energy and mental acuity of the workers and moreover, in a climate where delicate 
technical processes and procedures in the laboratory as well as animal experiments, 
are not interfered with by extreme heat.”57 Delhi, which had been recommended by 
Starling, was rejected as it was considered too hot.58 Bombay was rejected as it al-
ready had a small provincial laboratory. While rejecting the other main cities, the 
report gave the same reason: “What we have said about Bombay applies also to Cal-
cutta,” and “Our remarks on Bombay and Calcutta are applicable to Madras.”59 It 
is important to mention that large urban centers in India had become the main sites 
of the nationalist movement, particularly during the Non- Cooperation Movement 
(1921–22), which under Gandhi’s leadership had shaken the British government.60 
Fletcher’s choice was Dehra Dun, in the salubrious Garhwal foothills of north-
ern India.61 A small cantonment town, Dehra Dun had been built by the British as a 
site for imperial institutions, including the Imperial Forest Research Institute and the 
Geodetic Branch of the Survey of India, and was also the projected site of the Royal 
Indian Military College, the Railway Institute, and Telegraph Headquarters. Colonial 
offi cials favored Dehra Dun as a retirement site.62 According to the report, these in-
stitutions provided an ideal atmosphere for scientifi c discourse. It also had a “Leper 
Hospital for 80 beds,” which was considered adequate for providing clinical mate-
rials for the proposed CMRI.63
Fletcher’s agenda of autonomy in research thus translated itself in the colony 
into an urge to retain control of research in British hands. Before leaving for India, 
Fletcher, who had little prior knowledge about the country, had met Leonard Rog-
ers in London, and the latter had updated him about the “Indian affairs.” Fletcher 
wrote to Rogers gratefully: “Thank you indeed for the confi dential memorandum 
about Indian affairs that you have been good enough to send. Now I hope you will 
pray for me in the very anxious task I see ahead, for which ignorance seems to be 
my only qualifi cation.”64 Rogers had made Fletcher apprehensive of Indian involve-
ment. In December 1927, Victor Heiser, the Rockefeller Foundation’s International 
Health Board’s director for the East, met Fletcher in a “confi dential conference” in 
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into Indian hands unless special means are devised to change present tendencies.”65 
Thus, Fletcher’s other emphasis was on recruitment of staff. The report suggested 
the appointment of a committee, ostensibly to secure a closer liaison between medi-
cal research organizations in India and in Britain. In effect, it was to foster closer 
links between the metropolis and the empire by making the issue of recruitment a 
metropolitan one, superseding the political voices in India. The committee was to be 
composed of a representative of the India Offi ce, of the Ministry of Health (UK), of 
the MRC, and of the Royal Society. It would advise on general recruitment policy for 
Indian medical research workers as well. The Fletcher report also recommended that 
twenty- three out of thirty posts be reserved for IMS offi cers.66
Fletcher’s report refl ected an interesting convergence of contemporary metropoli-
tan and imperial concerns of laboratory research. The colonial scientists saw in the 
MRC and its arguments for autonomy in research a model for research in the colony. 
They found strong parallels between the MRC and the IRFA, particularly in their 
political insulation. When there were demands to include more legislative and In-
dian members into the IRFA, Rogers countered by showing how the IRFA had been 
“politicised” and “liberalised” over the years, unlike the MRC.67 Rogers also wanted 
the MRC to play a more active role in funding imperial research in India and Africa.68 
The Fletcher report gave a formal shape to such trends.69
With the submission of the report, the mood among the British medical men was 
confi dent. Rogers supported the idea that “suitable research men will in future have 
to be recruited mainly in Great Britain.”70 The GOI acted quickly on the proposals 
and passed the fi nancial approval through a Standing Finance Committee on Au-
gust 29, 1928, soon after the report was submitted, not waiting for it to be discussed 
in the Legislative Assembly.71 Edward Turner wrote to Arthur Hirtzel, undersecretary 
of state, in June 1929, that the secretary of state had approved of the formation of a 
selection board in India and a consultative board in England for the appointment of 
the scientists in the institute.72
While the government moved ahead with the plans, the Indian Legislative As-
sembly was questioning the motives behind them, particularly those concerning lo-
65 Diary of Dr. Heiser’s World Trip, 17 Oct. 1927 to 1 May 1928, 53–54, Rockefeller Archive Cen-
ter, New York. Fletcher had forged a strong relationship between MRC and the Rockefeller Founda-
tion, and in the interwar period the RF provided Britain with £2,500,000 for medical teaching and 
research. Austoker, “Walter Morley Fletcher” (cit. n. 51), 28.
66 Report of the Committee on the Organization of Medical Research (cit. n. 48), 48–62.
67 “Public Health Institute Calcutta—Founded with Assistance from Rockefeller Foundation Cen-
tral Medical Research Institute. Scheme in Abeyance of Fletcher Committee Report on the Organiza-
tion of Medical Research,” File 7B, 148, L / E / 9 / 610, APAC. 
68 Rogers to Graham, 17 Nov. 1927, ROG / A / 55 / 76, Rogers Papers.
69 However, A. V. Hill, in his famous report on scientifi c research in India, was careful to point out 
the limits of this comparison. While mentioning that the MRC in the UK “has an extremely free hand” 
and that the “Indian Research Funds Association (IRFA) plays a rather similar role in India” he added: 
“Its [IRFA’s] funds, however, are very scanty . . . Because of its poverty it cannot take the same broad 
view of its functions as the MRC does: for example, to maintain even a single clinical research unit in 
one of the medical colleges would be fi nancially out of the question until ampler funds are available.” 
A Report to the Government of India on Scientifi c Research in India (London, 1944), 20–21.
70 Rogers, note, “Public Health Institute Calcutta” (cit. n. 67), E&O 6102, 1928, 6, File B, L / E / 9 / 609.
71 Extract from Volume VIII, No. 1 of Standing Finance Committee, 29 Aug. 1928, L / E / 9 / 610, 
APAC.
72 Turner, undersecretary of state, to Fletcher, India Offi ce, 7 June 1929, 3449 / 28 E&O 6163, L / E / 
9 / 609, APAC.
 “SIGNS OF THE TIMES” 199
cation and personnel, two important areas of nationalist contestation. Members of 
the assembly raised questions about whether the Fletcher report had been reviewed 
before approval and about the choice of Dehra Dun as the site.73 In March 1929, M. S. 
Aney, leader of the INC and member of the Central Legislature, asked, “Are the Gov-
ernment aware that there is a strong feeling in the Indian medical profession against 
the recommendation of the Fletcher Committee to reserve a very large proportion 
of the cadre of the appointment in the Central Medical Research Institute for mem-
bers of the Indian Medical Service?”74 In June, the BMU wrote a note protesting the 
plans for the CMRI. They objected to two aspects of the Fletcher report: the choice of 
Dehra Dun—“a far- away place, removed from all facilities for clinical work”—and 
the reservation of almost all posts for IMS cadres.75 The president of BMU, Dr. G. V. 
Deshmukh, in a letter to the secretary of the Department of Education, Health, and 
Lands, alleged that the government was trying to rush the matter without a proper de-
bate.76 He added that the institute should be located in a university town and that the 
members of the independent medical profession wanted to participate in the debate. 
The isolated and imperial charters of Indian hill stations were increasingly subject 
to the pressures of political criticism in this period. This came as much from outside 
by leaders from the plains, as it did through the emergence of nationalist awareness 
among the resident population of shopkeepers, skilled workers, and the laboring poor 
of the hill stations.77 The critique of Dehra Dun as the site of the institute was part of 
this movement.
Thus, while for the British scientists the issue of location was about isolation, for 
the nationalists it was about inclusion. The Calcutta Medical Journal, a publication 
of the Calcutta Medical Club, protested the selection of Dehra Dun, saying that such 
a central research institute would have to deal with the problems of the whole of In-
dia.78 It stressed that medical research also needed to be closely linked to the “great 
sites of learning” in India.79 The Bombay Chronicle, a nationalist newspaper, com-
plained that while plans were going ahead for the establishment of a medical research 
institute for some time, “it is surprising that . . . no attempt has been made to secure 
the confi dence and invite the co- operation of the public, including the independent 
medical profession in the country.”80 The newspaper also criticized the government’s 
moves to secure funding with such “unseemly haste,” without discussions in the Leg-
islative Assembly. About Dehra Dun, the paper was sarcastic. “Dehra Dun is a nice, 
cool station, affording to the presumably European staff to be engaged for such in-
vestigations a perpetual holiday there on the adjacent hills.”81 The Bombay Chronicle 
supported the BMU demand that the new institute should be in a university town. The 
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issue soon became part of the Indian university movement, where nationalists had 
a long- term presence. The All- India Inter- Universities Conference of 1929 in Delhi 
passed resolutions asking the government to appoint a committee, with representa-
tives of the medical faculties of Indian universities, to report on the most suitable 
university centre for locating the proposed research institute.82
A prominent doctor and dean of Gordhandas Sunderdas (GS) Medical College of 
Bombay, Jivraj N. Mehta, wrote to Dr. Drummond T. Shiels, undersecretary of state, 
that the existing institutes in Dehra Dun, such as the Geodetic Branch of the Survey 
of India, the Railway Institute, and the Imperial Forest Research Institute, had little 
to contribute intellectually to medical research. The real motive, he suspected, was 
privilege and autonomy, with the institute set to become the “Eton or Harrow” of In-
dia.83 Mehta reiterated the nationalist demand that medical research had to go “hand 
in hand” with medical education.84 He also suggested that it had been possible to pass 
such a proposal through the IRFA because almost all its members were high govern-
ment offi cials, which was not the case in the Legislative Assembly.85
In London, Leonard Rogers remained dismissive of this nationalist challenge 
and advised the government not to pay much attention to these “unoffi cial” medi-
cal men.86 He urged the GOI to go ahead with the plans, which had been devel-
oping since the end of the war.87 Rogers prepared another note on recruitment. He 
pressed for a committee formed in England for the recruitment of the proposed in-
stitute as recommended by Fletcher.88 Rogers suggested that the committee should 
have representatives from the Royal Society as they had recently started a Tropical 
Diseases Committee. “Such men as Professor Nuttall of Cambridge would be very 
suitable,” as well as experts from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medi-
cine (LSHTM). Rogers also wanted university scholars from Edinburgh, “and I know 
that a fi rst class man is willing to serve on it if asked to do so.”89
Such a response sparked intense protests in India. In the Bombay Council, in Oc-
tober 1929, Dr. M. K. Dixit of the Surat Medical Union moved a resolution against 
Dehra Dun as the site.90 Ebrahim H. Jaffar moved a resolution in the Shimla Council 
in September, warning the government “that they cannot, they dare not, accept such 
a recommendation if they desire to retain the confi dence of the medical profession 
and the general public.”91 The government, however, still seemed to be in an uncom-
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promising mood and responded, “The Government of India . . . see no reason to al-
ter their decision that the Institute should be located at Dehra Dun as recommended 
by the Fletcher Committee.”92 Plans for the elite committee in England went ahead. 
The secretary of state, following Rogers’s suggestions, had written to the Medical 
Research Council, the Royal Society, and the LSHTM to send their representatives to 
the committee, and they had all warmly accepted.93
Meanwhile, the nationalists continued to press forward with their agenda. M. R. 
Jayakar94 moved another resolution that Dehra Dun as the site for the institute should 
be reconsidered and a committee be appointed for that purpose.95 Discussions in the 
Legislative Assembly were intense, and Frank Noyce, undersecretary to the GOI, 
suggested a compromise: a conference would be convened consisting of representa-
tives of the medical faculties of Bombay, Calcutta, Lahore, Lucknow, and Madras to 
discuss the issue. The government promised to give “their fullest and most careful 
consideration” to the conference’s recommendations.96 Jayakar accepted the sugges-
tion on the condition that three issues—location, recruitment, and funding—were 
included in the agenda.97 He ended on an ominous note: “I hope the Government will 
realise that the days of isolated hilltops are gone for ever.”98
Rogers reacted sharply to the proposal of the conference, calling it a “surrender.”99 
For him the greatest blunder was in opening the recruitment issue for discussion, 
which had grave moral and physical implications. “[L]iterally millions of lives, now 
annually sacrifi ced to such scourges as cholera, malaria, plague etc., are at stake, as 
nothing but the best qualifi ed research workers the world can produce are required 
in India at the present time.”100 He stressed that the funding and recruitment issues 
should not be sanctioned for discussion.101 Hirtzel agreed with Rogers, describing 
these political interferences in a matter of science as a “gross example of that prosti-
tution of every other consideration to political considerations.”102
The conference was held at Shimla on July 21–22, 1930. Noyce was the chairman; 
among the members were J. W. D. Megaw (DGIMS), J. D. Graham, and S. R. Chris-
tophers (director of CRI). The Indian contingent had a strong university representa-
tion: T. Krishna Menon Avargal (Madras University), M. N. Saha (Allahabad Univer-
sity), and Dr. J. N. Mehta (medical faculty, Bombay University). Zia Uddin Ahmad 
was the representative of the Legislative Assembly. Signifi cantly, the two agendas to 
be discussed were the site and constitution of the IRFA; the recruitment issue was left 
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out.103 Noyce explained that the question of recruitment was considered settled in a 
1928 press communiqué by the secretary of state, who saw no need to raise it again. 
The Indian delegates decided to discuss the issue nevertheless. 
The conference led to a protracted, often fractious, discussion between the Indian 
medical men and the British experts. The main objective of Indian scientists con-
cerning location was that the institute should be located in a university town in the 
plains—in Calcutta, Bombay, or Madras—which would ensure a closer link between 
research and education. Mehta even quoted from the earlier Starling committee, 
which had rejected the concept of a hilltop laboratory in favor of Delhi.104 The agenda 
of location of the institute was intrinsically linked to the other issue of recruitment. 
An institute in a university town could recruit and train more Indian graduates. The 
fi nal resolution, on which Christophers and Graham as advisory members did not 
vote, refl ected the nationalist agenda. It was resolved that a Central Medical Re-
search Institute should be located at a university center.105 Large- scale changes in 
the governing body of the IRFA were also proposed, with more members from the 
Department of Education, Health, and Lands and the Legislative Assembly, and from 
among nonmedical scientists and the medical faculties of universities.106 There was 
an addendum about recruitment: “the question of the reservation of posts in the Med-
ical Research Department for the Indian Medical Service should have been referred 
to this Conference.”107
These debates in India, to some extent, refl ected another debate in contemporary 
medicine: that between research scientists and medical practitioners, between labo-
ratories and hospitals, regarding the appropriate approaches to public health. In colo-
nial India, to the IMS offi cers—the proud inheritors of the traditions of public health 
now faced with the political challenges—research and autonomy seemed the more 
attractive option. To Indian medical practitioners, by contrast, research needed to be 
linked to the hospitals and the universities of the country.
“AN IMPASSE HAS NOW BEEN REACHED”
Forwarding the details of the conference to the government, J. D. Graham attached 
little credibility to the conference’s resolutions. He described them as “both anoma-
lous and confusing,” because a university group had debated upon a nonuniversity 
issue.108 He urged the government to keep medical research separate from the uni-
versity matters. He alleged that it was, in fact, the Indian universities that were the 
real sites of insularity regarding the issues of public concern in India, “nor did these 
gentlemen have any clear idea of the needs of India as a whole in this respect.”109
What had bothered the IMS offi cers most was the political intervention in medi-
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cal research. Rogers stressed that the Indian contingent in the conference was more 
a political outfi t than a scientifi c one. “Not a single one of the voting members had 
ever engaged in medical research work.”110 They were, what he called, the “politi-
cally minded university group.”111 The conference thus could not be regarded as be-
ing representative either of public opinion or of people connected with medicine. The 
conference and its resolutions to him were a “calamity” that had grave implications 
for the millions of Indians:
An impasse has now been reached, through the sanctioning of this ill- advised confer-
ence, in which the Government of India and the Secretary of State must face, once and for 
all, the responsibility of deciding whether the effi ciency of medical research in India, on 
which the future health of 350 million souls largely depends, is to be sacrifi ced to politi-
cal expediency or not . . . Real courage will now be required to avert the calamity which 
must inevitably result, if the hitherto effi cient administration of the medical research 
department of the Govt of India by a scientifi c Governing Body is subjected to the ruin-
ous political control of the non- research university representatives; as demanded by their 
majority group at the recent conference.112
This dislike of politics, as evident in Rogers’s words, went along with a preference 
for “effi ciency” and excellence. This particular inclination had a complex lineage. 
Part of it was the product of the national effi ciency movement in British Edward-
ian politics, which sought to revitalize the country in the face of its loss of position 
economically to rising powers such as Germany and the United States.113 Part of it 
was that modern science and development itself represented a language of effi ciency 
against the seemingly chaotic muddle of politics. For the British, this language and 
politics of effi ciency made particular sense in an increasingly politicized India. It 
had become the rationale behind arguments for preserving their control over medi-
cal research and other aspects of Indian civil life. Defending the older constitution of 
the IRFA with its British character, Rogers, in a 1932 note to the secretary of state, 
reiterated the link between effi ciency and morality: “if the Secretary of State should 
be forced to conclude that effi ciency must be sacrifi ced to political considerations, 
that sacrifi ce shall be made in clear knowledge of the facts, and with a full sense of 
responsibility for the inevitable resulting future loss of life from epidemic and other 
preventable diseases in India.”114 In London, meanwhile, Fletcher had learned about 
the Shimla conference and its resolutions. In a letter to Rogers, he expressed his con-
tempt for Indians and their politics: “It was the authentic chattering of the bandar-
 log.”115 Fletcher suggested that now British involvement in Indian science and medi-
cine was in question. “If, in a perfectly straightforward piece of scientifi c business 
like this, the Government of India show such vaccilation [sic], and play such a feeble 
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game against ignorant and divided but sharp- witted antagonists, it makes one doubt 
whether we have any business to be in India at all.”116
Rogers’s words and Fletcher’s sentiments proved to be prophetic. In 1932, a group 
of government medical personnel wrote to the secretary of state opposing most of the 
resolutions of the Shimla conference. According to them, the composition of the con-
ference was biased toward nonoffi cial members, which made the resolutions preju-
diced.117 They also opposed the conference’s propositions for the reorganization of 
IRFA.118 Most important, they noted that a new institute funded by the Rockefeller 
Foundation was being planned in Calcutta, so the plans for the central research in-
stitute could be postponed. The current fi nancial crisis, too, made the plans unten-
able.119 The CMRI was never to be established in British India, and the Rockefeller 
funded institute was to become a site mainly for training, not research.
The impasse that Rogers had referred to was an important one. It demonstrated that 
at certain points, accommodating the colonial identities of science and medicine to 
their emergent national ones had become untenable. This was the changing identity 
of science in India at this moment of political transformation. The hilltop laborato-
ries, the IMS cadre, the IRFA, and the moral imperatives of an “evolutionary” public 
health represented the identity of the imperial science. The transformation described 
above was not just from imperial to national science. The spaces of negotiation had 
broken down also because British imperial medicine increasingly found itself in a 
changing world. While nationalist ideology questioned the motives, aesthetics, and 
ethics of imperial research, international health initiatives and funding, from the in-
terwar era, had fast changed the norms of colonial health policy and research. Al-
ready by the 1920s, the schools of public health of American universities such as 
Johns Hopkins, Yale, and Harvard had become the centers of international public 
health instruction, attracting large numbers of foreign students. Signifi cantly, A. V. 
Hill, in 1944, while drawing up plans for the future national scientifi c institutions 
of India, mentioned that the postindependence all- India medical center should be an 
“Indian Johns Hopkins.”120 In addition, organizations such as the Rockefeller Foun-
dation were increasingly determining tropical health policies and research funding in 
Asia and Africa.121 Moreover, as we shall see next, the rationales of imperial medi-
cine had become untenable in another respect. The identity of the new nation and its 
medicine was to be built around new ideas of state, people, and welfare. 
“A REAL AND PRACTICAL IDEALISM”
While there was a stalemate reached at Shimla, there was new hope emerging else-
where. The 1930s and 1940s were also a period of new dreams and visions around 
medicine and public health, particularly for the emerging nation- states. The main ex-
position of this was in the ideas of “socialized medicine,” which defi ned much of In-
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dia’s public health planning of this period. Henry Sigerist played an important part in 
promoting this new ideology around health and development. A prominent critic of 
American health care, Sigerist stressed the need for a national health service and a so-
cially equitable distribution of health care with funding by the state. He stressed that 
“all the people should have medical care, irrespective of race, creed, sex, or economic 
status, and irrespective of whether they live in town or country.”122 The model behind 
his ideas was the Soviet Union, and in his Socialised Medicine (1937), he promoted 
its structure of health care to be adopted by other countries. According to him, the 
Soviet Union was the fi rst country to socialize medicine and recognize that protect-
ing the health of all the citizens was the responsibility of the state.123 These were not 
just issues of health and well- being; they were also overtly political and ideological 
issues. According to Sigerist, socialized medicine could exist in its true form only as 
an integral part of a completely socialized state. Here Sigerist differed from the con-
temporary proponents of “social medicine,” who stressed the more general social ap-
plication of medicine and a convergence of medical and social sciences. For Sigerist, 
socialized medicine meant “socialist medicine.”124 His ideas and his writings in the 
history of medicine had their ideological links with those of J. D. Bernal, who fol-
lowing his Soviet inspiration criticized social inequalities of science, developed plans 
for socializing science, and stressed the interaction between scientifi c, technical, and 
economic development. It is also important to mention that in the interwar period, the 
BMA and the medical profession of Britain had been challenged by a small group 
of radical socialist physicians under the Socialist Medical Association.125 This group 
too had been deeply infl uenced by the developments in the Soviet Union and the prin-
ciples of socialist medicine.126 This new ideology thus required a new politicization 
of the question of health care and a fresh alignment between the public and the state. 
Despite ideological opposition from several sections in the West, Sigerist’s So-
cial ised Medicine had become immensely popular among Indian medical person-
nel. Soon after its publication, Sigerist had come into contact with Indian doctors 
and administrators who were impressed by his work. In 1941, Dr. Kamala Ghosh, 
who had worked in India for eight years as part of the Women’s Medical Service 
and then pursued further studies in England, traveled to the United States for a few 
weeks. It was here that she found a new direction after reading Socialised Medicine. 
She wrote to Sigerist from New York: “reading your book on ‘Socialised Medicine’ a 
few weeks ago, all the problems in public health & education that I have been facing, 
were presented in an entirely new aspect, I became suddenly capable of solution.”127 
She decided to extend her stay in the United States to pursue a master’s program at 
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Johns Hopkins under Sigerist. Sigerist helped her to develop her research scheme, 
and Ghosh focused on the activities of local district boards and municipalities in 
India.128 When she fi nished her course, she wrote to Sigerist, fi lled with enthusiasm 
for her future work in India. “This whole year has meant a very great deal to me—
an entire new world of thoughts & ideas has opened out, something I was totally 
unaware of before; & I know it is going to make a difference in my work when I get 
home.”129 Although, tragically, Ghosh was killed on her way back to India, in Siger-
ist and in socialized medicine she had discovered a new vision for the future. As her 
sister Bimala Wallis wrote: “she found, for the fi rst time in her life, a real and practi-
cal idealism.”130
Sigerist visited India in December 1944, as an invitee to the Bhore Committee. 
(The committee had been set up in 1943, following nationalist demands for better 
health planning in India, under the chairmanship of Joseph Bhore, a lawyer and an 
ICS offi cer.) Sigerist realized that he was a familiar fi gure among Indians who knew 
about his knowledge of Arabic and Sanskrit and their classical texts. But it was his 
book on Soviet medicine that had been more widely circulated and read. “In Luck-
now I was told that there was only one copy in town—it was out of print—but that it 
had been circulated and that every doctor had read it.”131 Sigerist’s paper on medical 
education had been mimeographed by the Bhore Committee, and copies had been 
sent to all the members of the committee and to the deans of all the medical colleges. 
The Bhore Committee accepted a number of his recommendations and incorporated 
them in its fi nal report.132
For India, Sigerist suggested the same doctrine of socialized medicine, in which 
medicine and socialist developments were to be integral. “It is quite obvious that a 
health plan for India can hold a promise of success only if it is an integral part of a 
general economic and social plan.”133 Socialist planning with industrialization was to 
be the basis of the new regime of health, “the electrifi cation of the country must be 
the backbone of any health programme.” Electrifi cation would lead to better agricul-
tural productivity and higher income for the rural population. It would also provide 
power for the development of industries. The formula of development was straight-
forward: “[a] rising material and cultural standard would decrease the death rate and 
also the birth rate.”134
Under Sigerist’s infl uence, the Bhore Committee report became a documentation 
of socialized medicine in its insistence that public health was the fundamental re-
sponsibility of the state. The report made a case for a national health service, making 
references to his work on Soviet medicine. It was to also become the blueprint of In-
dia’s future medical infrastructure. 
In this stress on medicine and planned social development, the Bhore report had 
a precedent in India. The National Planning Commission (NPC) in 1939, created by 
the nationalists under Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, advocated a state- sponsored 
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planned development following the Soviet model.135 The INC established the NPC in 
1938 to draw up the blueprint of the social and economic reconstruction of postinde-
pendence India, marking the beginning of socialist planning in India. While develop-
ing the scheme of the NPC, around the same time that Sigerist published Socialised 
Medicine, Nehru was drawing equally from the developmental experiences of the 
Soviet Union.136 The NPC had a subcommittee charged with drawing up the provi-
sions of public health and medicine, with Sahib Singh Sokhey, an Indian IMS offi cer, 
in charge.137 The committee had recognized poverty as the main cause of ill- health, 
and the cornerstone of the scheme was a community health worker for every 1,000 
village population.138 Maintaining that the health of the people was the responsibility 
of the state, it stressed the need to integrate curative and preventive functions under 
a single state agency. However, through the Second World War, the Quit India move-
ment (1942), and Indian Independence (1947), the report remained unimplemented 
and the fi nal version was not published until 1947. Like these proponents of the Plan-
ning Commission, Sigerist too had his strong differences with Gandhi, whom he de-
scribed as a “reactionary,” seeking to take India back into the Middle Ages.139 
Sokhey, the main man behind the 1939 health planning, was also infl uenced by Si-
gerist and the Soviet Union.140 After independence, Sokhey became part of Nehru’s 
infl uential coterie of scientist- statesmen and was also a nominated member of the 
parliament. He continued his correspondences with Sigerist throughout the 1950s. 
One of Sokhey’s main interests was in the convergence of industrialism and health 
care, highlighted by his own involvement in the industrial manufacture of penicillin 
in India in the 1950s.141 In pursing these ideas he was confronted with the inequalities 
in international development, which hindered India’s medical infrastructure. While 
attending the WHO meeting in Geneva in 1953, he wrote to Sigerist about the impor-
tance of social and economic parity for better health care and how these international 
bodies did not appreciate the needs of the poorer countries. “[W]e fail to attach due 
weight to the fact that the world is very unevenly developed. We tend to graft Western 
practices on to an economic system which cannot carry them.”142 Reiterating the con-
clusions of his own report of a decade ago, he added: “the inescapable fact remains 
that if we would improve the health status of a people we can do so only by improving 
their economic and cultural status. . . . Improvements in health conditions can mate-
rialise only if the economic basis for them is prepared at the same time.”143 Sokhey 
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visited the USSR in 1953 to witness the development strategies around health and in-
dustry and was deeply impressed.144 He visited Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, 
went through the Volga dam and the industrial sites of Rostov, Kiev, and Tashkent, 
and he described the postwar reconstructions as well as the medical infrastructure 
to Sigerist; the large number of qualifi ed doctors, the great stress on “Health Educa-
tion” of the people, and the “abundance” of its medical infrastructure.145 Sokhey was 
awarded the Stalin Peace Prize in 1953, the same year as John Desmond Bernal.
Although this is not the place for a discussion of India’s national development 
projects and its links with those of Soviet Union, it is important to highlight the simi-
larities that these two new nations experienced in such pursuits. The Soviet Union 
was the fi rst of Europe’s multiethnic states to promote national consciousness over a 
wide variety of ethnic populations and to establish the institutional forms of the mod-
ern nation- state. The Bolshevik government, to defuse nationalist sentiment, trained 
new national leaders, established national languages, and fi nanced the industrial in-
frastructures of the modern nation- state. To that extent, its nationalist developmental 
experience was comparable to that of India.146
Another Indian doctor deeply inspired by Sigerist was Dr. Mahendra Bhatt, who 
passed his MBBS from Bombay University in 1941, and in 1945 he was awarded a 
Watumull Foundation fellowship for two years’ study in the United States. He worked 
at the Department of Tropical Medicine, Tulane University, New Orleans. Following 
that he traveled in the United States and Canada, studying public health and medical 
care programs as arranged by the Harvard School of Public Health and sponsored by 
the Watumull Foundation.147 Throughout this period, Bhatt was in regular contact 
with Sigerist, and following the latter’s suggestion, he and his wife set off on a tour 
of Europe as well to study public health institutions in different countries. He also 
planned to visit the USSR but could not secure a visa during the war. In November 
1947, soon after Indian independence, Bhatt set out for India, full of ideas and ex-
periences he had encountered during his sojourn and enthusiasm for the new nation. 
He wrote to Sigerist on board ship in the Mediterranean, “So we are heading towards 
new India!”148
In India, he applied himself in serving local health in the new state of Saurashtra, 
in western India. He helped with the creation of a new Department of Public Health, 
started rural health centers, child welfare centers, a nutrition and school health or-
ganization, antimalaria and fi larial units, and mobile health education units in the 
shape of vans.149 In 1950, he was appointed director general of Health Services of 
the Indian government as a special offi cer of health education and was posted to the 
capital  Delhi.150 However, he returned to Saurashtra a few years later to continue his 
work there. He wrote to Sigerist about the need he had felt to work in the interior 
of the country: “[I]f we want to improve and build up our health services the young 
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people with ideas and ability have to go to the interior and work in the fi eld. I feel I 
will be able to contribute more by doing comprehensive public health work in these 
areas.”151 Despite these local engagements, Bhatt had continued his interest in inter-
national health movements from where his inspiration had come. He had contacted 
George Rosen of Columbia University following Sigerist’s suggestions in developing 
his projects on health education in India.152 In 1954, when Sigerist was planning to 
visit the USSR, Bhatt expressed a desire to join him to study the public health setup 
there.153 Sigerist probably never made this trip due to failing health; he died in 1955.
This movement of the 1930s, which followed through to postindependence India, 
was an important aspect of Indian’s nationalist engagement with the question of 
health, which developed in congruence with the ideas of India’s scientifi c industri-
alism and development planning. While the ideas and identities of imperial health 
care were being challenged, there was a new alignment taking place between poli-
tics and medicine. Sigerist’s scheme had appealed to Indian nationalists as it was a 
health plan with a clear political inspiration, something that the imperial and British 
models had been opposed to. The stress on local health, as evident in the cases of 
Ghosh, Bhatt, and Sokhey, was also distinct from the erstwhile British involvement 
in Indian local health and the constitutional provincialization of medical infrastruc-
ture on 1919, which was more an administrative issue deriving from the British tra-
ditions of local health care. The inspiration for these people had come from a differ-
ent political ideology of grassroot activism and equitable distribution of resources. 
At the same time, there was a new legitimization of the state; the nation- state was to 
be the inspiration behind and provider of the health care of its people. Thus a new 
link between public health and state was envisioned. The three individuals studied 
above show three different aspects of internationalism, socialism, and the question 
of Indian health  practices.
CONCLUSION
This essay has demonstrated how the identity of Indian nationhood and its choices 
of scientifi c models and infrastructure were intrinsically linked. Although the gov-
ernment of India had abandoned plans for a central research institute, the debates 
changed the discourse of medical research in India. In the short term, the British 
increasingly lost their grip over recruitment issues, and hostile questioning over the 
salaries and other benefi ts of European medical researchers continued in the Legis-
lative Assembly.154 The Bhore Committee recommended the establishment of a na-
tional medical center.155 The foundations were laid in 1952, and the All India Institute 
of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) started functioning in Delhi in 1956.
In the longer term, there has been the mixed heritage of Indian medical science 
and national identity. The twin critiques of location and personnel, which was so 
crucial against imperial privileges and essential to Indian nationalism, have remained 
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important issues in postcolonial India. Through their criticism of the IMS, Dehra 
Dun, and IRFA, the nationalists and the medical men had urged for more provincial-
ized and rural health care and more economically and socially accountable institu-
tions. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), as the IRFA was renamed in 
1949, actively promoted research in medical colleges and universities rather than in 
research institutes by bringing them in direct contact with research workers and with 
the outstanding research problems facing the country.156 From 1953, with the help 
of Rockefeller Foundation fellowships, the ICMR funded research in medical col-
leges and established several research units in university colleges in Agra, Bombay, 
and Calcutta.157 A report by the ICMR declared in 1957 that a new chapter had been 
opened and medical research was no longer confi ned, as in the days of the IRFA, to 
the research institutes in hill stations. “It has been brought to where it belongs—to 
centres of teaching and learning.”158
Indian nation building, however, has not been without its own institutions and sites 
of privilege and the marginalization of the questions of politics. The Bhore Commit-
tee report, while being critical of the British medical research initiatives and urging 
for more widespread medical infrastructure in India, also supported the continuance 
of centralized research and disregarded the rural medical plans of the Sokhey re-
port of 1939. Medical infrastructure, despite substantial investment in rural sectors 
through planned economy, has tended to remain urban oriented. Urban centers and 
metropolises have become the sites of real privilege and power in postcolonial India. 
In the preoccupation with building the major projects and medical infrastructure for 
the country, the smaller sanitary projects around drains and clean water had been 
overlooked, a movement that the British did initiate in India and Gandhi championed 
over large research institutes and hospitals. “The science of sanitation is infi nitely 
more ennobling though more diffi cult of execution, than the science of healing.”159 
The legacy of “socialized medicine” lives in India in the People’s Health Move-
ment (parallel to the People’s Science Movement) with the goal to establish health 
and equitable development in local, national, and international policy. These move-
ments continue to campaign with a slogan reminiscent of the ideas of the 1930s: 
“Health for All.”160 However, with 30 percent of the population still under the poverty 
line and facing starvation and malnutrition, alongside an increasingly affl uent and 
insulated middle class, these movements have struggled to establish the “right to 
health” as a fundamental right of the people of India.
The issue of personnel and politicization of recruitment has produced the most 
important and enduring legacy in India. Indian nationalism was a political struggle 
for state power, based often on demands for a greater share in jobs in technical and 
administrative posts, which had ultimately led to the crisis of imperial manpower. 
This politics found its manifestation in postindependence India in the socially repre-




159 “Mr MK Gandhi, in Opening the Tibb College,” Indian Medical Record, Aug. 1921, 184–85, 
185.
160 Ravi Duggal, “Health and Development in India: Moving towards Right to Healthcare,” mimeo 
(2003), Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT), Mumbai.
 “SIGNS OF THE TIMES” 211
sentative reservation of government and academic jobs for the deprived communities 
for their own political and economic empowerment. Reservation has since become 
the most critical force and feature of Indian democracy and nationhood. Yet at the 
same time, the logic of effi ciency and merit has remained fundamentally a rationale 
of privilege, and Indian nationhood has embraced it as much as it has generated its 
critique. In India today, the groups protesting against Reservation (as recently led by 
the students of AIIMS) loathe this very politicization of recruitment and manpower, 
using the same notions of “effi ciency” and excellence.
